Volume 27
Issue 4 Natural Gas Regulation in the Western U.S.: Perspectives on Regulation in the Next
Decade
Fall 1987

The Implications of Gas Policy for the Western States: A Producer
Perspective
Michael Campbell

Recommended Citation
Michael Campbell, The Implications of Gas Policy for the Western States: A Producer Perspective, 27 Nat.
Resources J. 823 (1987).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol27/iss4/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

MICHAEL CAMPBELL

The Implications of Gas Policy for
the Western States: A Producer
Perspective
"Regulation in the Next Decade," the topic of this collection of articles,
should be approached with some trepidation. In approaching this topic
from the standpoint of gas producers, a general consensus would indicate
that regulation of the natural gas industry, particularly the regulation of
producer prices for interstate gas, was nearly disastrous for this country.
That type of price regulation has of course changed drastically with
the passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) in 1978.' The NGPA
is the present and most recent policy pronouncement of public policy in
the industry. That Act clearly mandates a policy of deregulating wellhead
natural gas prices and as such was generally welcomed by most major
producers.
Additionally, there have been public policy pronouncements by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [FERCI particularly within the
last several years which have had a profound effect on the industry. FERC
Order 380,2 which eliminated the ability of interstate pipeline companies
to "minimum" bill their customers, has caused pipelines "to move back
through their lines" to the wellhead and to exert pressure on producers
to renegotiate take-or-pay commitments. FERC Order 436,' providing
for open access transportation, has caused interstate pipeline companies
to rouse from their lethargy and move away from their historic purchase
and resale role (their role as a "merchant" in a regulatory environment)
toward the role of a mere facilitator, a transporter of gas sold and purchased by others. 4
Moreover, there has been a decided shift in the economic market for
natural gas, particularly in the Western demand markets, such as California. State regulators, intent on insuring consumers the cheapest gas
possible, have permitted, and in some instances directed, their jurisdictional utility companies to pursue opportunities for spot market purchases
at prices significantly below those dictated by pipeline-producer contracts.
I. 15 U.S.C. §§3301-3432 (1982).
2. Order No. 380, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,778 (1984).
3. Order No. 436, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,423-24 (to be codified at 18 C.FR. §284).
4. Order 436 has been reconsidered as a result of Associated Gas Distributors vs. FERC No. 851811 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 1987). FERC has issued Order No. 500, 52 Fed. Reg. 39,334 (1987),
that is intended to clarify certain portions of Order 436. As of this writing, the effects of Order 500

remain unknown.
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This regulatory and market environment has indisputably caused "turmoil" within the natural gas industry. There is no debate about that. The
question arising from this industry "turmoil" is who will bear the loss?
What party in the chain should answer for the tremendous economic
exposure resulting from this regulatory and market upheaval?
Consumers say, "Don't look at us-we're going to buy the cheapest
gas available-we're under no minimum bill contracts or duties requiring
us to buy a pipeline's dedicated commodity-priced gas-and we're not
going to do it." The pipelines are saying, "Don't look at us-we merely
transport the gas-we make no money on the cost of gas component of
our rdtes-we shouldn't be the one's to suffer."
That leaves in the chain only the producer. To date, it has been the
producer, not consumers or the pipelines, who has carried the economic
loss engendered by the turmoil in the natural gas industry. It is the producer
who has been saddled with all, or certainly most, of the economic loss
in this environment.
As a caveat, while the topic of this paper is related to "integrated
producers," there is not, in my view, a bright line distinction between
the present problems being encountered by independent producers of gas
and those problems being encountered by "integrated producers" or major
producers. Most of the major producers of natural gas are engaged in the
natural gas industry as producersof natural gas. While some majors own
and operate minor pipeline facilities and some may share an intra-corporate relationship to a sister pipeline company, it is fair to say that
generally, this region's major energy companies view themselves as natural gas producers, as opposed to gas purchasers or transporters. As such,
the major companies are experiencing the same turmoil that the independent producers are encountering.
It is true that majors, as majors, generally have their own "gas marketing departments" and may be conceptually better equipped than independents to cope and react to this market "turmoil." But the speed at
which this "turmoil" has come has left most producers, majors as well
as independents, at roughly the same starting gate.
Pipelines have mounted an all-out attack on their contractual obligations
to producers, including major producers. In judicial forums throughout
the country they have attempted to abrogate their contracts, particularly
their take-or-pay obligations on various grounds-ranging from claims
of force majeure and commercial impracticability to a high-sounding
suggestion that they have a "federal duty" to avoid their contractual
promises. Fortunately, these avoidance claims have not met with much,
if any, success in the courts.5 State and federal judges throughout the
5. See Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., No. CV-86-369(J) (Judgment on jury verdict, Jan.
22, 1987) (Permanent injunction, Mar. 24, 1987), appeal docketed, No. 17094 (N.M. May 21,
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country are holding pipelines to their contractual promises. The federal
regulators have also recognized this point. As FERC recently stated, the
risk of unmarketable gas is "exactly the type the parties, not the Commission, should apportion under private contracts." 6
However, this debate on who will bear the economic loss occasioned
by market and regulatory upheaval is shifting and will continue to shift

away from the courts and into regulatory and congressional forums where
contractual performance may be only one of the components of public
policy debate. That shift, away from the courts and into congressional
and regulatory forums, rightly causes, I think, some nervousness among
producers. And it is the debate in those forums to which this paper is
directed: the principal of the sanctity ofproducerlpipelinecontracts must
remain a cornerstone of any "regulation" of this industry in the next
decade.
The historic scheme of regulation in this industry has been predicated
on the sanctity of private contracts.' The United States Supreme Court
has stated: "By preserving the integrity of contracts [the regulatory scheme]
permits stability of supply arrangements which all agree is essential to
the health of the natural gas industry."' That statement is as true today
as it was 30 years ago in the United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Mobile Gas
Service Corp. case. In United Gas, the Supreme Court was confronted
with an attempt by an interstate pipeline unilaterally to amend a longterm contract. The Supreme Court held that the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 9
"does not give natural gas companies the right to change their rate contracts by their own unilateral action. '° The Court reasoned as follows:
In construing the Act, we should bear in mind that it evinces no
purpose to abrogate private rate contracts as such. To the contrary,
by requiring contracts to be filed with the Commission, the Act
expressly recognizes that rates to particular customers may be set by
1987); Coquina Oil Corp. v. Transwestem Pipeline Co., No. 86-562-M Civil (D. N.M. Sept. 19,

1986) (this case is on interlocutory appeal before the 10th Circuit, No. 86-2483); Lively Exploration
Co. v. Valero Transmission Co., No. 2930 (Dist. Ct. of Sulton County, Texas, filed Sept. 16, 1985);
Moore McCormack Oil and Gas Corp. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., No. 85-13599 (Dist.
Ct. of Harris County, Tex., entered Apr. 14, 1986); Amoco Production Co. v. Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp., No. 83-11570 (Civ. Dist. Ct. for the Parish of Orleans, La., filed
June 28,
1985); Hanover Petroleum Corp. v. Tenneco, Inc., No. 84-5987-D (Civ. Dist. Ct. for the Parish of
Orleans, La., July 8, 1986). See also Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., No. 83-C-400B (N.D. Okla., June 19, 1985); Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., CA30723-R (N.D. Tex. 1986).
6. Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,423, 42,443 (1985).
7. See Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,437 (1985), citing H. S. Phillips v. FERC, 586 F.2d
465, 469 (5th Cir. 1978). See also United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350
U.S. 332, 338 (1956).
8. United Gas Pipe Line Co.v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 338 (1956).
9.Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §§717-717w (1982).
10. United Gas, 350 U.S. at338.
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individual contracts. . . . [TI he Natural Gas Act permits the relations
between the parties to be established initially by contract, the protection of the public interest being afforded by supervision of the
individual contracts. .... 1.

The Supreme Court's conclusion is particularly relevant to future regulation of the natural gas industry:
Our conclusion that the Natural Gas Act does not empower natural
gas companies unilaterally to change their contracts fully promotes
the purposes of the Act. By preserving the integrity of contracts, it
permits the stability of supply arrangementswhich all agree is essential to the health of the naturalgas industry ... [Dienying to
natural gas companies the power unilaterally to change their contracts
in no way impairs the regulatory powers of the Commission, for the
contracts remain fully subject to the paramount power of the Commission to modify them when necessary in the public interest. The
Act thus affords a reasonable accommodation between the conflicting
interests of contract stability on the one hand and public regulation
on the other."
Accordingly, under the Natural Gas Act, only the FERC may abrogate
contracts, and the FERC itself "lacks affirmative authority, absent extraordinary circumstances, to 'abrogate existing contractual arrangements.' "3 This power must be exercised pursuant to Section 5(a) of the
Act, which permits the Commission to set aside and modify any rate or
contract which it determines, after hearing, to be "unjust, unreasonable,
unduly dliscriminatory or preferential." 4
With'the advent of the NGPA of 1978,"5 the already limited authority
of FERC to interdict producer contracts under the Natural Gas Act was
severely curtailed. As noted by the Consumers' Counsel decision: "the
NGPA eliminated the Commission's ratemaking authority over 'first sales'
of natural gas (including any sale of natural gas to an interstate pipeline)
immediately.. . . Interstate pipelines, however, unlike producers, remained subject to regulation by the Commission .... "6
The jurisdictional changes brought about by the NGPA were recently
described by the Supreme Court:
The NGPA is designed to preserve the Commission's authority under
the [Natural Gas Act] to regulate natural gas sales from pipelines to
II. Id. at 338-39.

12. Id. at 334 (emphasis added).
13. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 582 (1981), citing Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 820 (1968).
14. United Gas, 350 U.S. at 341.

15. See supra note 1.
16. Office of Consumers' Counsel v. FERC, 783 F.2d 206, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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their customers; however, it is designed to supplant the Commission's
authority to establish rates for the wholesale market, the market
consisting of so-called 'first sales' of natural gas.'"
Thus, the FERC no longer has jurisdiction to interpret the contract
terms. 8 As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Pennzoil v. FERC,
passage of the NGPA evidenced "Congress' express and specific intent
not to preempt the ability of private persons to contractually govern their
relationship."" According to the NGPA, contractual provisions are overridden only to the extent that they provide for prices in excess of the
statutory ceilings set by the NGPA. 2"
In fact, the Congressional intent to deregulate producers was so important that the NGPA includes an exception to the general rule of ongoing
pipeline regulation. In order to coordinate the continued regulation of
pipelines with the deregulation of wellhead prices, Section 601(c)(2) of
the NGPA removes from the FERC any power to prevent interstate pipelines from passing the cost of gas through to their customers, absentfraud
and abuse or similiar grounds.2' By this approach, Congress sought to
avoid the prospect of indirect, "back door" regulation of producers that
could result if it were easy for FERC to deny pass-through of the prices
by pipelines paid to producers.22
FERC itself has made it "crystal clear" for example, that nothing in
its Order 436' rules has abrogated any contracts or created a regulatory
framework predicated on any unilateral contract abrogation. Order 436
states, "[tihe scheme of regulation is predicated on a system of private
contracts. 2'
Federal regulators-and indeed Congress should stay that historic
course-to maintain the sanctity of contractsas the principle underpinning
or any public policy debate. To do otherwise would result in permanent
destabilization of the natural gas industry in response to what may be
characterized as temporary market disruption.
There are areas of appropriate regulatory inquiry in the present envi17. Public Service Commissions of New York v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co., 463 U.S. 319, 332
(1983). FERC recently explained the rationale of the NGPA as evidencing a Congressional conclusion
that while "gas production was sufficiently competitive to remove regulation, the control which
interstate pipelines exercised over transportation still conferred on them the same kind of market
power over their customers as had existed at the time of enactment of the [Natural Gas Act]." Order
No. 436, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,418 (1985).
18. See Pennzoil v. FERC, 645 F.2d 360-80 (5th Cir, 1981).
19. Id. at 375-76.
20. Id.
21. Consumers' Counsel, 783 F2d at 214.
22. ld. at 221.
23. See supra note 3.
24. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,423-24 (1985).
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ronment. FERC announced last November that it will issue a notice of
inquiry on the practices and regulation of marketers and brokers who are
affiliated with regulated interstate pipeline companies. 25 As the producing
industry makes its first tentative steps into this direct sales, free market
environment, there is a very real potential for abuse and discrimination
by pipelines in favor of their own affiliated interests. Major producers
certainly have no fear of marketing competition, but they want to be
assured of a level playing field. FERC should be congratulated on their
effort in this area. I don't think there is a more pressing or fruitful area
of inquiry than that one.
Another area where regulatory time would, in my view, be well spent
is the expedited examination and approval of various NGPA abandonment
petitions, including one by this state's major interstate pipeline. I understand that a variety of consumer groups and state utility commissions
are actively opposing those NGA abandonment requests. It is very difficult
for me to appreciate how state utility commissions can, on one hand,
demand unrestricted access to spot market opportunities while, on the
other hand, restrict and impede the efforts of major producers and pipelines to move NGA gas into that free market environment. They want to
have their cake and eat it too. They are "free marketers" demanding a
rubber band on long-term dedicated supply. That position is logically
inconsistent. It should be given short shrift and these abandonment requests should be granted.
In concluding, I would urge that while limited regulatory action is
needed to assist a proper transition to a free gas market, the integrety of
private contracts must remain a guiding principle if the industry is to
secure long-term health and stability. To choose another course may
undermine the very foundation of the gas industry, and create instability
in the sanctity of future contracts.

25. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,982 (1986).

